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Abstract
Trust management is an approach to scalable and ﬂex-
ible access control in decentralized systems. In trust man-
agement, a server often needs to evaluate a chain of cre-
dentials submitted by a client; this requires the server to
perform multiple expensive digital signature veriﬁcations.
In this paper, we study low-bandwidth Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks that exploit the existence of trust management
systems to deplete server resources. Although the threat
of DoS attacks has been studied for some application-level
protocols such as authentication protocols, we show that
it is especially destructive for trust management systems.
Exploiting the delegation feature in trust management lan-
guages, an attacker can forge a long credential chain to
force a server to consume a large amount of computing re-
source. Using game theory as an analytic tool, we demon-
strate that unprotected trust management servers will easily
fall prey to a witty attacker who moves smartly. We report
our empirical study of existing trust management systems,
which manifests the gravity of this threat. We also propose
a defense technique using credential caching, and show that
it is effective in the presence of intelligent attackers.
1 Introduction
As the world is increasingly connected by the Internet,
the need for entities from different security domains to dy-
namically collaborate, share resources and conduct sensi-
tive transactions grows more and more important. Trust
management (TM) [4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24]
is an approach to enable such collaboration and resource
sharing. In TM systems, an entity’s privilege is based on
its attributes instead of its domain-speciﬁc identities. An
entity’s attributes are demonstrated through digitally signed
credentials. Delegation is an important mechanism for scal-
able and ﬂexible trust management. Instead of relying on
one or a few commonly trusted parties (e.g., certiﬁcate au-
thorities), delegation allows each domain to autonomously
determine who can access its resources and how such trust
decisions can be propagated to entities from other domains;
this nicely models complicated trust relationships between
collaborating parties. Thus, in order to access a local re-
source, an entity from other domains submits a chain of cre-
dentials (or a set of credentials that form a graph) to prove
its privileges. A TM server will check the authenticity of
the submitted credentials and determine whether these cre-
dentials form the right proof of the legitimacy of the entity’s
access request.
In this paper, we study denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in
TMsystems. Recently, DoSattacksthatexploitapplication-
level vulnerabilities have become an increasing concern for
Internet applications. Different from network-level DoS
attacks, these attacks usually consume a small amount of
bandwidth and therefore are more difﬁcult to detect. For ex-
ample, an attack that exploits the fact that an authentication
server needs to perform expensive RSA decryption opera-
tions needs only a bandwidth of several Megabits/second to
bring down a website [8]. Such an attack rate could easily
be mingled into normal trafﬁc. Compared with authenti-
cation systems, TM systems are even more susceptible to
this type of DoS attacks. Like authentication systems, TM
systemsrequire a server to verify signatures, a computation-
intensive operation. Most common secure sites cannot sus-
tain more than 4,000 DSA veriﬁcations per second, even
specially-designed hardware servers cannot perform more
than 18,700 DSA veriﬁcations per second [2]. Unlike au-
thentication systems in which every service request leads to
only a single or at most a few veriﬁcation operations, TM
systems allow delegation, which opens the door for an at-
tacker to force a server to perform tens or even hundreds
of veriﬁcation operations with a single request. The length
of a credential chain can be arbitrarily large in theory. Be-
cause many credentials are not secret and are often sent in
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data and by eavesdropping. An attacker can also generate
new public/private keys and create new credentials. There-
fore, an attacker has a lot of freedom in carefully craft-
ing credential chains to most effectively consume server
resources. In addition, credential-chain based DoS is also
stealthier than authentication based DoS. While 4000 con-
current SSL sessions may trigger the alarm on a website, 80
trust management sessions, each asking the server to verify
50 credentials, could appear less suspicious.
Automated trust negotiation (ATN) [28, 29, 30] adopts
the basic TM approach but considers the fact that creden-
tials may contain sensitive information and need protection
just as resources do. ATN techniques enable strangers to
establish trust in each other through cautious, iterative, bi-
lateral disclosure of credentials and policies. Because ATN
adopts the TM approach, it is subject to the same kind of
DoS attacks as TM systems. The issue of DoS attacks in
ATN systems has been discussed in a previous paper [25];
however, the gravity of the problem was not analyzed. The
approach proposed in [25] is for the server to abort once
it receives an irrelevant credential, and after that to ban
the client at the ﬁrewall. This approach requires protection
from external mechanisms such as a ﬁrewall. Even with this
protection, a single malicious client can still force a server
to spend signiﬁcant resources, and a small number of coor-
dinating malicious clients can bring down the server.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst systematic study of
the problem of DoS attacks in TM systems. There are
three types of resources involved in the interaction between
the server and the clients, CPU, memory and bandwidth.
Among them, CPU resource for signature veriﬁcation is
usually the bottleneck for TM systems, and thus becomes
the focus of this research.
We illustrate that DoS attacks are a serious concern in
two steps. We ﬁrst present a qualitative study that identify
the DoS vulnerabilities in existing trust management sys-
tems. We choose KeyNote [4] and TrustBuilder [29] as the
two sample systems to study. The former is the most ma-
ture and efﬁcient publicly available implementation of TM
systems that we are able to ﬁnd, while the latter is the only
trust negotiation prototype system that we have access to.
Similar vulnerabilities likely exist in other TM systems as
well. In the second step, we build a multi-threaded server
that uses KeyNote, and successfully launch a DoS attacks
to bring down the server. In fact, the attack would have
succeeded if we chose any other TM systems that we have
looked at, as they have worse performance than KeyNote.
We analyze the credential veriﬁcation strategies attack-
ers and servers can use in DoS attacks against TM systems.
The server’s goal is to identify an attacker as quickly as pos-
sible; and the attacker’s goal is to make the server verify as
many as possible. Using game theory, we show that the
equilibrium strategy pair is randomized, and the expected
number of credentials that need to be veriﬁed is on aver-
age half of the length of the credential chain. This means
that, even if a TM server adopts the best veriﬁcation strat-
egy, if the attacker moves intelligently, it becomes impos-
sible for the server to determine the legitimacy of a service
request before committing a substantial amount of comput-
ing resources. This illustrates the need to develop additional
countermeasures defending against potential DoS attacks.
We propose the ﬁrst countermeasure to this threat, cre-
dential caching with a caching strategy tailored speciﬁcally
to defend against DoS attacks. Credential caching allows
the server to cache valid credentials that have appeared
before to reduce the cost of credential chain veriﬁcations.
This approach has several interesting features. Credential
caching improves the performance even when no DoS at-
tacks are being carried out. In addition, credential caching
implicitly enables legitimate users to help a trust manage-
ment server defend against DoS attacks. The more legit-
imate users a trust management interacts with, the more
valid and relevant credentials will be cached by the server,
which will in turn signiﬁcantly reduce the veriﬁcation cost
even if attackers submit forged credential chains. This fea-
ture is not available in existing countermeasures against
DoS attacks. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of
this approach.
One may wonder that since TM systems have not been
widely deployed yet in today’s decentralized applications,
whether it is worthwhile to investigate DoS attacks against
them. We argue that DoS resilience is an important secu-
rity requirement for decentralized authorization. The risk of
DoS attacks needs to be carefully analyzed. Effective coun-
termeasures should be studied and seamlessly integrated
with the design of TM systems. Ignoring its potential vul-
nerabilities and waiting attackers to exploit them ﬁrst will
only incur much higher costs to ﬁx the problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we review existing work on TM systemsand DoS attacks.
In section 3, we conduct case studies of two existing trust
management systems, and qualitatively analyze their vul-
nerability to DoS attacks. Our attack models and assump-
tions for DoS in trust management are presented in section
4. In section 5, we use game theory as a tool to analyze the
gravity of DoS attacks against trust management. We pro-
pose in section 6 credential caching as a countermeasure.
An empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of credential
caching against DoS attacks is presented in section 7. We
conclude the paper in section 8.
2 Related Work
A large amount of work has been done on trust manage-
ment. The term trust management was coined by Blaze,
2Feigenbaum, and Lacy, in [5]. They also presented Pol-
icyMaker, the ﬁrst design of a trust management system.
Blaze et al. later introduced KeyNote [4], which includes a
well-deﬁned format and semantics for credentials and poli-
cies. SDSI (Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure) [24]
and SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure) were two pub-
lic key infrastructures which also support delegations. They
were later merged into a uniﬁed framework [6, 11]. Li et
al. introduced Delegation Logic [20], a logic-based trust
management language, and RT [21], a family of Role-based
Trust-management languages that combine features from
trust management and role-based access control. Other trust
management languages that have appeared over the years
include the Query Certiﬁcate Managers [14], the Secure
Dynamically Distributed Datalog language [17], and the
Binder language [9].
All the above work assumes uni-directional trust estab-
lishment, i.e., the service provider is trusted, and only the
client has to show its credentials to prove its privilege. In
the approach of automated trust negotiation [28, 29], mech-
anisms formutual trustestablishment were proposed, which
support the protection of the contents of the client’s creden-
tials as well. Hess et al. [16] proposed the Trust Negotiation
in TLS (TNT) protocol to integrate trust negotiation into the
SSL/TLS handshake protocol.
Denial-of-service attacks and defense have been studied
for two decades. Most existing work, however, focuses on
the high-bandwidth network DoS, in which attackers pro-
duce a large volume of attack trafﬁc to saturate the vic-
tim’s links. By comparison, low-bandwidth DoS attacks are
easier to launch and less visible to the victim, but equally
destructive. Most of these attacks exploit application-level
vulnerabilities. For example, stack smashing1 and the ping-
of-death attack2 crash an Internet server by overﬂowing vul-
nerable buffers inside the server software. Some attacks
can exploit algorithmic weaknesses: Crosby and Wallach’s
work [7] shows that carefully crafted inputs could degrade
hash tables to linked lists, and thus force a web proxy to run
at its worse-case performance.
An important type of low-bandwidth DoS attacks tar-
gets at authentication protocols. Authentication relies on
resource-consuming public-key decryption. Attackers can
send a large number of messages with bogus signatures
to deplete an authentication server’s CPU cycles. Mead-
ows [23], Aura et al [3] and Dean and Stubbleﬁeld [8] have
pointed out this problem.
A potential defense against authentication-based DoS
is incremental authentication which requires a weak but
high-speed authentication ﬁrst and a stronger authentica-
tion later [23]. An alternative is client puzzles which ask
1http://www.phrack.org/show.php?p=49&a=14
2http://www.insecure.org/sploits/ping-o-death.
html
the client to solve a puzzle and prove to the server its
work before authentication begins. An inherent weakness
of many Internet applications is that attackers may con-
sume signiﬁcant server resources at little cost. Client puz-
zles strive to improve this situation: the client is required to
commit resources before the server does. This technique
has been used to mitigate DoS threats to network proto-
cols [18, 26, 27]. Aura et al. ﬁrst introduces it to authentica-
tion protocols [3] and its effectiveness has been empirically
evaluated by Dean and Stubbleﬁeld [8], using TLS as an
example.
To the best of our knowledge, the only work discussing
DoS in trust management is by Ryutov et al. [25]. Several
heuristics, such as the server’s load, the relevancy of cre-
dentials, and the number of rounds of credential exchanges,
have been used to identify potential DoS attacks as well as
other abnormal activities. They, however, do not provide a
systematic analysis of the problem. Also, there are no eval-
uations of the gravity of DoS attacks and the effectiveness
of their proposed heuristics.
3 Denial of Service Vulnerabilities in Trust
Management Systems
In this section, we analyze the denial of service vul-
nerabilities in existing trust management systems. After
comparing with several candidates, we choose to analyze
KeyNote [4] and TrustBuilder [29]. The former is the most
mature and efﬁcient publicly available implementation of
trust management that we are able to ﬁnd, while the lat-
ter is the only trust negotiation prototype system that we
have access to. Our analysis in this section is qualitative.
In Section 7, we build a multi-threaded server that runs the
KeyNote program, and successfully launch a DoS attacks to
disable the server.
3.1 Case Study: KeyNote
KeyNote [4] is a simple and ﬂexible trust management
system designed to work well for a variety of Internet-based
applications. It has been published as Internet RFC 2704 in
1999. In KeyNote, both policies and credentials are mod-
eled as assertions, which contain predicates that describe
the trusted actions allowed by the key holders. KeyNote
credentials have the same syntax as KeyNote policies, but
are signed by the principal delegating the trust.
The latest implementation of KeyNote, version 2.3 [19],
contains a command line tool and a reference library. There
are four basic functions in the KeyNote library: key gen-
eration, signature generation, signature veriﬁcation, and re-
quest evaluation. The key generation function can be used
to generate a pair of public and private keys. The signature
generation and veriﬁcation functions are used to sign cre-
3dentials and verify credentials. The request evaluation func-
tion are used to determine whether an action request should
be granted or denied, given a set of assertions (i.e., policies
and credentials). The KeyNote reference library is written
in C, and is very efﬁcient. In our experiments on a 2.53GHz
Intel Pentium 4 machine with 384MB RAM running Red-
Hat Linux 9.0, the speed of a credential veriﬁcation is about
3.5ms and 0.1 ms for DSA signature algorithm and RSA
signature algorithm, respectively, with 1024 bit key length.
In the DSA setting, verifying a credential chain length of
10, 100, and 1000 takes about 35ms, 354ms, and 3.77s, re-
spectively. In the RSA setting, verifying a credential chain
length of 10, 100, and 1000 takes about 1.2ms, 9.7ms, and
101ms, respectively. We do realize that RSA veriﬁcation is
much faster than DSA veriﬁcation (about 20-40 times faster
depending on the settings [1]). Nevertheless, DSA, a United
States Federal Government standard for digital signatures,
is still popular among many security services.
In a typical setup of KeyNote, whenever a client wants
to access a resource, it needs to connect to an authoriza-
tion server and submits an action request along with a set
of credentials. The authorization server will evaluate the le-
gitimacy of the client’s request according to the submitted
credentials and the server’s policies using the request eval-
uation function provided by the KeyNote API.
We observe the following DoS vulnerabilities in autho-
rization servers using KeyNote:
• No upper bound on the number of credentials. Since
KeyNote only provides a reference library instead of
a complete software package for the implementation
of an authorization server, the request evaluation func-
tion itself does not impose any upper bounds on the
number of credentials that it will accept. If an autho-
rization server uses the library as it is without consid-
ering possible DoS attacks, then an attacker can send
an arbitrarily large number of credentials to the server,
exhausting its computational resources.
• Not fail-stop during signature veriﬁcation. In fail-stop
model [13], whenever a party detects any deviation
from the protocol by the other participant, it termi-
nates the communication immediately. The KeyNote
implementation does not adopt the fail-stop strategy
when verifying credential signatures. If a client sends
a set of credentials along with an action request, the
request evaluation function will verify the signatures
of all credentials even when some invalid signatures
have been detected. The reason of this design may be,
according to the trust management semantics, even if
one credential fails to verify, as long as among all cre-
dentials submitted there exist a valid chain, the autho-
rization should still be allowed. However, this design,
while logically correct, may be exploited by malicious
clients to launch DoS attacks, even if it does not pos-
sess any valid credentials.
• Asymmetric computational load. The computational
cost for the server is much higher than the cost of a
client, as the server needs to perform signature veri-
ﬁcations whereas the client simply needs to send cre-
dentials to the server. An attacker may continuously
send action requests and credentials to the server, ex-
hausting its computational resources.
Note that this property is not speciﬁc to servers us-
ing KeyNote. Instead, it holds for any credential-based
authorization server. However, since KeyNote request
evaluation function does not use the fail-stop strategy,
the vulnerability of servers using KeyNote is particu-
larly severe.
Note that it is possible for the authorization server to ver-
ify the signatures of the credentials ﬁrst before submitting
them to the KeyNote engine. Then the server can decide
whether to stop the authorization process if it receives a
failed credential. However, as the KeyNote engine has al-
ready provided the functionality of credential veriﬁcation, it
would be intuitive for users to rely on the KeyNote engine
to perform both credential veriﬁcation and policy evalua-
tion, which however may be subject to DoS attacks. Fur-
ther, even if credential veriﬁcation is done by applications
and fail-stop is adopted, a malicious client can send valid
but irrelevant credentials to the server to launch a new DoS
attack. Therefore, it is desired to integrate the DoS defense
mechanism directly into the KeyNote engine.
3.2 Case Study: TrustBuilder
TrustBuilder [29] is the ﬁrst implementation of ATN. It
was designed and developed by researchers at Internet Se-
curity Research Lab at Brigham Young University. Trust-
Builder was developed in Java, and uses X.509v3 certiﬁ-
cates. It adopts the policy language and policy compli-
ance checker in the IBM Research’s Trust Establishment
system [15]. We ran our experiments on TrustBuilder on
a 1.70GHz Intel Pentium M processor with 768MB RAM
running Windows XP Professional. Each X.509 credential
is signed using the RSA signature algorithm with 1024-bit
key length. In our experiments, a client and a server, both
running TrustBuilder, communicate with each other using
a TCP socket. A trust negotiation involving the veriﬁcation
of a credential chain with 28 credentials takes about 4.5 sec-
onds.
TrustBuilder has an upper-bound on the number of cre-
dentials received each round, e.g., the server can receive at
most 30 credentials from the client at each step of the nego-
tiation.
The latest version of TrustBuilder is vulnerable to DoS
attacks in the following perspectives:
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dential is useful for a negotiation session only when
it is relevant to the server’s access control policy. In
the current implementation of TrustBuilder, a server
ﬁrst veriﬁes all the credentials received from the client,
whether they are relevant to the negotiation or not. An
attacker is thus able to send unrelated credentials to the
server, making the server verify all of them. Note that
this attack does not even require the attacker to forge
credentials, since the attacker can always assume new
identities by creating new public/private key pairs, and
issue irrelevant credentials by using these identities.
• Not fail-stop. Same as the Keynote system, Trust-
Builder does not use the fail-stop strategy. When the
server receives an invalid credential, the server ignores
the credential and continues the negotiation.
From the above two case studies we see that the cur-
rent design of trust management systems does not take
application-level DoS attacks into consideration. We show
in Section 7 that, with the current design of trust manage-
ment systems, DoS attacks can be easily launched to effec-
tively deny the service of an authorization server.
4 Model and Assumptions in Analyzing DoS
Attacks
We now describe the model and assumptions for analyz-
ingDoSattacksintrustmanagement. Oneimportantfeature
of TM and ATN systems is that trust is distributed among
multiple principals and can be delegated from one principal
to another. Here, we present a simple model to capture the
delegation feature. In the model, there are multiple prin-
cipals, each of which has a unique public-private key pair.
Every policy is described by a trust tree. The trust tree cor-
responding to a server’s policy will have the server as the
root of the tree. A node of the tree represents a principal,
and an edge represents a digital credential. Given an edge
v → w in the tree, the corresponding credential means that
the parent node v delegates the trust to the child node w.
The credential is signed by the private key of v. The leaf
nodes in the tree represent the principals who do not have
delegation right, whereas the non-leaf nodes represent prin-
cipals who can delegate trust to others.
For example, Alice is a student at StateU. She has a stu-
dent credential from College of Science (CoS), which has a
credential issued by StateU. StateU is certiﬁed by Accredi-
tation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET). The
credential chain to prove that Alice is a valid student takes
the form root → ABET → StateU → CoS → Alice.
There are four credentials associated with this chain. Sup-
pose the server’s policy is that students can access the re-
source. Alice could show the credential chain to the server,
proving that she satisﬁes the policy.
When a client and a server begin interaction, they ﬁrst
establish a secure communication channel so that they can
verify each other’s identity. Such a channel can be estab-
lished using, for example, TLS/SSL [10] with self-signed
certiﬁcates. After such a channel is established, both client
and server are certain that the other party holds the pri-
vate key corresponding to the claimed identity (i.e., public
key). After the session is established, the server can deter-
mine whether the client possess credentials that satisfy the
server’s policy for the requested resource.
Attackers Assumptions and Strategies There are two
kinds of attackers: insiders and outsiders. An insider at-
tacker is someone who has a valid credential chain and can
legally access the server. An outsider attacker does not have
a valid credential chain to gain access, and aims at bringing
down the server. Within the insider attackers, some of the
insiders has right to delegate (i.e., can issue arbitrary new
valid credential chains), others do not have such rights (e.g.,
insiders that belong to the leaf nodes of the credential tree).
The ﬁrst type of insider attackers are rare and are hard to
detect, we do not consider them in this paper and leave it as
future work. For the second type, an insider attacker may
constantly connect and disconnect from the server, making
the server verify its credential chain again and again. It can
behave exactly as a regular principal within each session.
Insider attackers can be addressed in several ways, such as
session caching, limiting the number of sessions, and deter-
rence measures such as revoking access once DoS behavior
is detected. Because the number of insiders is limited and
the possibility of using deterrence measures, we believe that
outsidersaremoreseriousconcerns inDoSattacks. Wethus
focus our analysis on outsiders. We note that the credential
caching techniques we propose in Section 6 can be used in
defending against insider attackers as well as outsider at-
tackers.
As an outsider attacker does not satisfy the server’s pol-
icy, it does not control any node in the trust tree correspond-
ing to the server’s policy. However, the attacker can collect
a large number of credentials in the trust tree and can forge
arbitrary new credentials. An outside attacker can carry out
the following attacks.
1. Sending a large number of valid, but irrelevant creden-
tials.
2. Sending a valid credential chain of another principal.
3. Sending a credential chain from the trust root to itself;
however, some credentials in the chain are faked, i.e.,
have signatures that do not verify. We observe that
an attacker only needs to have one faked credential in
such a chain: The attacker ﬁrst collects a valid creden-
tial chain v0 → v1 →     → vk where v0 is the trust
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access. The attacker can then generate n − k + 1 new
principals v′
k,...,v′
n, and creates a credential chain
v′
k → v′
k+1 →     → v′
n; however, to link the above
two chains together, the attacker has to fake the cre-
dential vk−1 → v′
k, as it does not control the principal
vk−1. Note that all the credentials except the one from
vk−1 to v′
k in the chain could be valid. We also observe
that in this case, the credential chain can be arbitrarily
long.
Server Strategies: We now describe the strategies a TM
server should use when facing the threat of DoS attacks.
1. The server does not verify any credential until it re-
ceives a complete credential chain that connects to the
trust root at one end and to the client identity (that
has been authenticated during the establishment of the
communication channel) at the other end. In other
words, the server starts verifying credentials in a chain
only after it is certain that if all credentials in the chain
arevalid, then the clientwillgain access. This prevents
against attacker strategies such as sending irrelevant
credentials and sending other principals’ valid creden-
tial chains.
2. The server sets an upper bound for the length of a cre-
dential chain. If the server receives a credential chain
longer than that limit, it refuses to process the chain.
Because the delegation feature in trust management
allows local autonomy, the server may not know the
length of all valid chains. Choosing the right bound
becomes a tradeoff between DoS threats and cutting
off some legitimate principals.
3. The server uses fail-stop model [13] for credential
chain veriﬁcation, that is, when the server ﬁnds one
invalid credential, it stops verifying the chain and ter-
minates the communication session.
4. Given a credential chain, the server may not necessar-
ily verify the chain from the beginning to the end. We
will further discuss this in next section.
By using the above strategies, the only attacker strategy
that remains effective is the one of sending a chain that con-
nects the trust root to the attacker, but has one faked cre-
dential in the chain. We analyze this situation in the next
section.
5 A Game Theoretical Analysis on Creden-
tial Chain Veriﬁcation
Using the model in the previous section, we study the
following problem: the attacker tries to deplete the server’s
CPU cycles by having the server verify a long credential
chain faked by the attacker. This problem, which we call the
credential chain veriﬁcation problem, can be speciﬁed as
follows. The attacker sends to the server a credential chain
of length n, in which one credential is invalid (i.e., with in-
validsignature). Assumingtheattackercanplacetheinvalid
credential in any position of the chain, it has to determine
where to place it so that the number of signature veriﬁca-
tions performed by the server is maximized. On the other
hand, given a set of credentials, the server intends to ﬁnd an
optimal strategy to verify the credential chain such that the
number of signature veriﬁcations is minimized. This game
can be modeled as a two-player zero-sum game (see Deﬁ-
nition 1), as the interests of the attacker and the server are
diametrically opposite.
Deﬁnition 1 (Two-player zero-sum game) In the two-
player zero-sum game (also called matrix game), there are
two players A and B. Player A has n strategies and player
B has m strategies. The strategies chosen by the two
players determine the outcome of the game. Each possible
outcome has two payoffs, one for each player; and the sum
of the payoffs is always zero. We use an n × m matrix to
represent the payoffs of A for each of the n   m possible
outcomes (the payoffs of B are the opposite of A’s, thus are
not presented in the matrix).
We assume that the server ﬁxes its upper bound on the
length of acceptable credential chains to n and the attacker
alsoknowsthisbound. Inthematrixgameforourcredential
veriﬁcation problem, the attacker has n possible strategies,
the ith strategy placing the invalid credential to the ith po-
sition of the chain. The server has n! possible strategies,
each of which corresponds to a unique veriﬁcation order
(or a permutation of {1,...,n}). For example, the server’s
strategy (x1,...,xn) represents a veriﬁcation order, i.e.,
the server ﬁrst veriﬁes the x1th position, then veriﬁes the
x2th position, and so on. The payoff for the attacker is the
number of signature veriﬁcations the server performs before
it detects the invalid credential, which the attacker tries to
maximize while the server tries to minimize. This game is
called “veriﬁcation game”. Figure 1 describes a veriﬁca-
tion game where the length of the credential chain is 3.
The above game has a “solution” in which both players’
strategies are optimal. This has been formally described in
the following minimax theorem.
Theorem 1 (Minimax Theorem) [12] Every n × m ma-
trix game has a solution. that is, there is a value of the game
v, and there are optimal strategies for players A and B such
that (1) if A plays its optimal strategies, A’s expected pay-
off will be ≥ v, no matter what B does, and (2) if B plays
its optimal strategies, A’s expected payoff will be ≤ v, no
matter what A does.
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1 1 1 2 3 2 3
2 2 3 1 1 3 2
3 3 2 3 2 1 1
Figure 1. The veriﬁcation game with n = 3.
The rows in the matrix stand for the attacker’s
strategy and the columns in the matrix stand
for the server’s strategy. Each entry in the
matrixstandsofthepayoffoftheattacker, i.e.,
the number of signature veriﬁcation before
the server detects the invalid credential.
In the above game, no matter which strategy the attacker
chooses, there is always a corresponding strategy for the
server such that the payoff for the attacker is minimized
(i.e., to 1); similarly, given any strategy chosen by the
server, there is always a strategy for the attacker to maxi-
mize its payoff (i.e., to n). This suggests that an optimal
strategy here must be probabilistic, in the sense that either
player will randomly choose their strategies according to
some probability distribution. Such a probabilistic strategy
is also called “mixed strategy” in game theory.
In the following proposition, we show that the veriﬁca-
tion game has a simple solution.
Proposition 2 In the veriﬁcation game, an optimal mixed
strategy for the attacker is to play each possible strat-
egy with 1/n probability, an optimal mixed strategy for
the server is to play the strategy (y1,...,yn) with the
probability of 1/2 and (yn,...,y1) with the probability of
1/2, where (y1,...,yn) can be any permutation to array
(1,...,n).
The proof of the above proposition is omitted due to the
space limit. We will give the proof in the full version of this
paper.
The above proposition shows that an optimal strategy for
the attacker is to randomly pick a position between 1 to n
to place the invalid credential. An optimal strategy for the
serveristoﬁrstdetermineanorderofallthecredentials, and
then choose to verify the credential chain by that order or by
the reverse order with the same probability. Note that the
preceding optimal strategy is not the only possible optimal
strategy. For example, the mixed strategy that the server
uniformly randomly picks a strategy from the n! possible
strategy is also optimal.
Conclusion of this game Our analysis shows that if a
server sets its upper bound to n, then a strategic attacker
can make the server verify (n + 1)/2 credentials on the av-
erage, no matter what veriﬁcation strategy the server uses.
This demonstrates that, without further protection mecha-
nisms, trust management systems are vulnerable to denial
of server attacks.
6 Defense: Caching Veriﬁed Credentials
In this section, we present a simple defense mechanism
against DoS attacks in TM systems: the server caches a cre-
dential in the memory once it veriﬁes the signature success-
fully. When a server needs to verify a credential, it ﬁrst
checks whether the credential has been cached. If so, it
does not need to perform the signature veriﬁcation com-
putation. To make this defense mechanism effective, we
have to answer the following questions: What strategy the
server should use to verify a credential chain when a cache
exists? When the cache is full, which credential should be
discarded? When answering this question, we have to keep
in mind that the attacker will try to decrease the effective-
ness of caching by cleverly ordering the credentials to be
presented.
Credential chain veriﬁcation with unlimited cache
Input:
c1,...,cn: the credential chain in order.
D: the database of cached credentials.
Output:
true or false: the result of the veriﬁcation.
D: the updated credential database.
Procedure:
For i = 1,...,n
Compute hi = hash(ci),
If hi  ∈ D, verify the signature of ci
If ci is invalid, return false,
Otherwise D = D ∪ hi,
Return true.
Figure 2. Pseudocode for credential chain
veriﬁcation using cache
To save memory, the server stores the hashes of the cre-
dentials rather than the credentials themselves. We use D
to denote the database of cached credentials. The algorithm
for credential chain veriﬁcation is presented in Figure 2.
Note that in the algorithm the server always veriﬁes the cre-
dential chain from the trust root to the client. This is differ-
entfromtheoptimalstrategywederivedintheprevioussec-
tion. The presence of a cache changed the optimal strategy.
There are two reasons that one should verify the creden-
tial chain in order. First, if the server veriﬁes the credential
chain from the trust root, only credentials in the trust tree
can be added into the database. Recall that the attacker can
create new principals and issues credentials between these
principals. Since such credentials do not belong to the trust
7tree, they will not be cached in the credential database. An
attacker thus cannot ﬁll the database with irrelevant creden-
tials. Second, when the server caches enough valid creden-
tials, the number of credential veriﬁcations needed is mini-
mized when the server veriﬁes the credential chain starting
from the trust root.
We observe that if all credentials in the trust tree that
have been collected by an attacker is cached, then the server
can detect any faked credential chain within one signa-
ture veriﬁcation. Given a credential chain c1,...,cn cre-
ated by the attacker, there exists a k ∈ [1..n] such that ck
is an invalid credential, c1,...,ck−1 are valid credentials
in S, and ck+1,...,cn are valid credentials but not in S.
Clearly, when the server veriﬁes the chain from the begin-
ning, c1,...,ck−1 are all cached and do not need to be veri-
ﬁed. Therefore, the server only needs to verify the signature
of ck before it detects the faked chain.
In many scenarios, the server does not have enough
memory to store all the credentials in the trust tree. It
thus needs to decide which cached credentials to be re-
placed when the cache is full. One naive approach is to
use well-known memory caching replacement strategies,
such as LFU and LRU. However, these caching strategies
may not be optimal in our model, as the traditional caching
strategies focus on overall performance for normal users,
whereas in our model we need to consider the worst case
scenario launched by a sophisticated attacker.
To design a caching strategy that makes DoS attacks less
effective, we ﬁrst give some theoretical analysis, assuming
that we know T, the trust tree corresponding to the server’s
policy. Let S be the set of all credentials in the tree. Let
m be size of the server’s cache, i.e., the server can store at
most m credentials. Given an edge u → v in the tree, let c
be the corresponding credential. We use h(c) to denote the
height of c, which is the distance between v and the farthest
descendant of v. In our strategy, the server only keeps cre-
dentials whose height is larger than some threshold. More
speciﬁcally, let Si = {c ∈ S | h(c) ≥ i}. Clearly, S0 = S
and Si+1 ⊆ Si for any positive i. Let σ be the threshold
such that |Sσ| ≤ m and |Sσ−1| > m. The best caching
strategy for the server is to cache all the credentials in Sσ
and as many credentials in Sσ−1 as one can. We now prove
that this strategy is optimal for the server.
Claim 1 If the server caches Sσ, then no matter how the
attacker chooses its strategy, the number of credential veri-
ﬁcations needed by the server is bounded by σ + 1.
Proof. Recall that the attacker creates a faked credential
chain and sends it to the server for veriﬁcation. Suppose
the attacker collects all the credentials in S. To fake a cre-
dential chain of length n, the attacker chooses a node vk in
the tree with depth k. Let c1,...,ck denote the credentials
in the path from the root v0 to vk. The attacker then fakes
a credential ck+1 and creates n − k − 1 valid credentials
ck+2,...,cn. Observe that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, d(ci) is greater
than or equal to k −i. Therefore c1,...,ck−σ ∈ Sσ. When
the server veriﬁes the credential chain, the server does not
need to verify c1,...,ck−σ, as they are already stored in the
cache. The only credentials potentially need to be veriﬁed
by the server are ck−σ+1,...,ck+1. Thus, the number of
credential veriﬁcations is bounded by σ + 1.
Claim 2 Suppose |Sσ| = m. If the server caches any cre-
dentials not in Sσ, then it is possible for an attacker to con-
struct a credential chain such that the server has to perform
more than σ + 1 credential veriﬁcation.
Proof. Since |Sσ| = m, if the server caches any credentials
not in Sσ, then at least on credential in Sσ is not cached. Let
c be such a credential. Since d(c) ≥ σ, there exists a valid
credential chain c1,...,ci = c,...,ck such that k − i ≥
σ. Then if the attacker submits c1,...,ck,c′, where c′ is a
credential with a forged signature, then the server at least
has to verify the validity of credentials ci,...,ck,c′, which
involves more than σ + 1 signature veriﬁcations.
The above two claims show the optimality of caching
Sσ. When the server knows the trust tree, it can statically
compute Sσ and achieve this optimality easily. However, in
reality, the server does not know the whole trust tree, since a
large part of the tree is constructed by other domains which
directly or indirectly get delegation from the server. Thus,
it cannot pre-compute Sσ. We need to let the server dynam-
ically adjust the cached credentials so that the database can
approximate Sσ.
To achieve this goal, we propose a new caching strategy
where the server keeps the credential hash along with its
height. If the cache becomes full, the server replaces the
credential that has the smallest height. If the height of a
newly veriﬁed credential is smaller than the height of any
existing credential in the cache, then no replacement will
take place. The caching algorithm is presented in Figure 3.
The caching algorithm in Figure 3 takes two steps. In
the ﬁrst step, the server ﬁnds the credential that is invalid
by going through the credentials in the chain one by one. In
the second step, if the credential ci is already in the data-
base, the server updates its height (if needed) by setting the
e(ci) = max(e(ci),k − i). If the credential ci is not in the
database, the server inserts the credential hash in the data-
base along with the height e(ci). The server can implement
this caching algorithm using a hash table for the credential
hashes and a priority queue for the heights. We shall discuss
the implementation issues in details in next section.
Beneﬁts and Limitations of Credential Caching The
credential caching approach has the following advantages.
• Credential caching is beneﬁcial even when there are no
DoS attacks. Many legitimate credential chains share
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Input:
c1,...,cn: the credential chain in order.
D: the database of cached credentials.
Output:
true or false: the result of the veriﬁcation.
D: the updated credential database.
Procedure:
Set k = n,
For i = 1,...,n
Compute hi = hash(ci),
If hi  ∈ D, verify the signature of ci,
If ci is invalid, k = i − 1, break;
For i = 1,...,k
If there exists an entry  hi,e  ∈ D, update
the entry with  hi,max(e,k − i) ,
Otherwise, insert  hi,k − i  into D;
If |D| > m, remove those tuples from D
that has the smallest height.
If k = n, return true, otherwise return false.
Figure 3. Pseudocode for credential chain
veriﬁcation with cache replacement strategy
common credentials. For example, consider the cre-
dential chains proving university students, if the cre-
dentials for all universities and colleges are cached,
then verifying a student’s credential chain only re-
quires one more signature veriﬁcation.
• Credential caching implicitly has legitimate users in-
volved in defending against DoS attacks. Once a trust
management server interacts with a legitimate user, all
the user’s valid credentials will be cached. These cre-
dentials will then not be helpful to attackers. Thus, the
more legitimate users the server serves, the more re-
silient the server is against DoS attacks. This property
is not observed in other countermeasures against DoS
attacks.
• Credential caching allows the server to set a larger
upper-bound on the length of credential chains that can
be accepted. This allows the server to be able to handle
unusually long valid credential chains. With credential
caching, the upper bound does not affect the number of
credentials to be veriﬁed by the server. This is because
even when an attacker presents a very long chain, only
those that are in the trust tree with at most one ad-
ditional credential will be veriﬁed. This bound can
thus be set based on other resource limitations, such
as bandwidth concerns, and result in a larger bound.
We point out that credential caching cannot completely
eliminate the DoS threat to a TM system. This is because
a TM server will still have to verify at least one credential
from the client. However, as we will discuss in the follow-
up section, caching helps greatly mitigate the threat of DoS
attacks, making them more difﬁcult to happen. We believe
that an effective combination of credential caching with
other existing DoS countermeasures such as puzzles [3, 8]
will make a TM system robust against DoS attacks.
Note that credentials can be expired or revoked. It is
useful in practice to keep the expiration date along with the
credential hash in the database. The server can then remove
the credentials that have been expired from the database pe-
riodically. Given a credential, the server can easily lookup
the database and check whether it has been cached or not.
If the server wants to check whether the credential has been
revoked, it may need to query the certiﬁcate revocation list
with additional costs. We stress that the purpose of creden-
tial caching is to save the server from expensive signature
veriﬁcations.
7 Experiment Results
In this section, we present the results of our empirical
study on DoS attacks and defenses in trust management and
negotiation systems. We ﬁrst use KeyNote [4] as an exam-
ple to demonstrate that a DoS attack can easily paralyze a
trust management server (Section 7.1). Then, we evaluate
theeffectiveness of an implementation of credential caching
system in mitigation of DoS threats (Section 7.2).
7.1 Multi-Client KeyNote Server
KeyNote is an open-source library for the KeyNote trust
management system. To study the DoS vulnerability of
KeyNote, we ﬁrst built a multi-client KeyNote server us-
ing C, and then launched a DoS attack on that server. In
our implementation, a client connects to the KeyNote server
through TCP sockets. Each connection to the server is han-
dled by a different thread. Upon receiving the public key
and credentials from the client, the server calls KeyNote
API to verify the credentials and to further check whether
the whole credential chain satisﬁes the server’s policy.
We carried out the experiments on a 2.53GHz Intel Pen-
tium 4 machine with 384MB of RAM running RedHat
Linux 9.0. We use 1024-bit DSA algorithm as the key gen-
eration and signature algorithm. The key ﬁle and credential
ﬁle are stored in base64 format. The size of a credential
is about 1.6KB. As discussed in Section 3, the KeyNote
program is able to verify a credential in 3.5ms. In the-
ory, the server can be paralyzed by less than 457KBps of
trafﬁc. In our experiments, a KeyNote client kept sending
credential chains of length 20 to the server at the rate of
40 requests per second. Each request was about 32KB in
size. As shown in Figure 4, the number of requests in the
9server’s queue kept increasing until the server reached its
limit on the number of allowed socket connections. The
server had been completely disabled after 280 requests (7
seconds). Figure 5 illustrates the latency experienced by
legitimate users who tried to connect to the server during
and after a DoS attack. We assume that legitimate users
connected to the server at a constant rate of 2 requests per
second for 50 seconds. The DoS attack was launched at the
ﬁrst 10 seconds. From Figure 5, we can see that even after
the DoS attack ﬁnished for 5 seconds, the latency for a le-
gitimate request was still around 4 seconds. This is because
the server was still busy at processing the pending creden-
tials received from the attacker. These results demonstrate
that an unprotected KeyNote server is indeed vulnerable to
DoS attacks.
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Figure 5. Latency for legitimate keynote
clients during and after attack. The DoS
attack was launched during the ﬁrst 20 re-
quests.
7.2 Credential Cache System
We implemented a credential cache system based on Fig-
ure 3 using C++. Our system maintains three data struc-
tures: a credential cache, a hash table, and a binary heap ta-
ble. The credential cache is an array, each element of which
stores the message digest of a credential that has been suc-
cessfully veriﬁed. In addition, each element also stores a
16-bit number that is the height of the credential and two
integers that index into the credential cache array. These in-
dexes enable elements to form linked lists. The hash table is
used to quickly determine whether the message digest of a
credentialisinthecache. Letmbethesizeofthecache, i.e.,
maximum number of credentials that can be cached, and ℓ
be the length of binary representation of m. The size of the
hash table is 2ℓ, i.e., the size of the hash table is the small-
est power of 2 that is greater than or equal to m. Given the
message digest of a credential, the last ℓ bits of the message
digest are used as a hash value that indexes into the hash
table. All credential digests with the same hash value are
organized into a linked list. The binary heap table is used
to implement a priority queue, so that we can efﬁciently re-
move the credential with the smallest height from the cache
when the cache is full. Each element in this table contains
an index to the credential cache and a copy of the height
value of the credential. This copy is used to improve access
time of the heap. Assuming the message digest is 20 bytes
long, then each element in the cache takes 30 bytes and each
element in the heap takes 6 bytes. To cache 1M credentials,
the credential cache and the heap takes 36M memory. The
hash table has size less than 2M, and each element in the
table takes 4 bytes. Therefore, we can cache 1M credentials
using no more than 44MB memory.
When using caching, one should always verify a creden-
tial chain from the trust root to the leaf. Before actually
verifying a credential’s signature, one should ﬁrst check
whether the credential’s message digest is in the cache.
Inordertomeasuretheeffectivenessofthecachesystem,
we simulate a trust tree. We create a tree with 500k node.
With the probability of 0.5, each node has either 0 child or
1-8 children. The maximum depth of the tree is 16. For a
randomly chosen node in the tree, the average distance to
the root is 13.3. We create a credential for each edge of the
tree.
Our experiments were carried out on a 2.53GHz Intel
Pentium 4 machine with 384MB of RAM running Red-
Hat Linux 9.0. Using OpenSSL’s DSA implementation and
benchmarks, the server can perform a 1024-bit signature
veriﬁcation in 2.81ms. In our experiment, we generated 1M
requests for credential chain veriﬁcation. For each request,
we randomly picked a node from the tree, and passed the
corresponding credential chain (from the root to the node)
to the veriﬁcation program. On average, it took 2.8ms to
10verify a non-cached credential and took less than 0.01ms
to verify a cached credential. For every 1000 requests, we
recorded the total veriﬁcation time and the number of sig-
nature veriﬁcation performed. It took about 37 seconds and
13.3k signature veriﬁcations to process 1000 requests with-
out cache support. With the support of the caching system,
the processing time dropped quickly. For example, in the
case that the cache size was equal to the size of the tree, af-
terprocessed500krequests, theserveronlyneededtoverify
299 credentials out of 13266 credentials and hence the hit-
ting rate was 97.7%. If the cache size was 1/8 of the tree
size, the hitting rate after 500k requests also became more
than 90.3%. A performance chart of the cache system is
given in Figure 6. In the ﬁgure, “full cache” refers to the
setting in which the cache size is the same as the tree size;
similarly, “1/2 cache” means the cache size is half of the
tree size. Note that the cost of the cache maintenance op-
eration (e.g., insert, delete, update) is negligible comparing
with the cost of credential veriﬁcation.
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Figure 6. Credential veriﬁcation time and
numbers of signature veriﬁcations per each
1000 requests
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We analyzed the vulnerabilities of DoS attacks in trust
management systems, and proposed credential caching as
a countermeasure to such attacks. Empirical studies have
showed that credential caching is an effective means of
mitigating DoS attacks against TM servers. Future work
includes integrating the credential caching system with
KeyNote and TrustBuilder. As ATN protocols are more
complicated than a single credential chain veriﬁcation, fu-
ture work also includes studying other DoS vulnerabili-
ties in ATN systems and providing corresponding defense
mechanisms.
Acknowledgement
This work is supported by NSF IIS-0430274, NSF CCR-
0325951, and sponsors of CERIAS. We thank the anony-
mous reviewers for their helpful comments.
References
[1] Crypto benchmarks. http://www.eskimo.com/∼wei
dai/benchmarks.html.
[2] Server’s benchmarks. http://www.sun.com/servers/
coolthreads/t1000/benchmarks.jsp.
[3] T. Aura, P. Nikander, and J. Leiwo. Dos-resistant
authentication with client puzzles. In Proceedings
of the Cambridge Security Protocols Workshop 2000.
LNCS, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[4] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, and A. D.
Keromytis. The KeyNote trust-management system,
version 2. IETF RFC 2704, Sept. 1999.
[5] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy. Decentralized
trust management. In Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 164–173.
IEEE Computer Society Press, May 1996.
[6] D.Clarke, J.-E.Elien, C.Ellison, M.Fredette, A.Mor-
cos, and R. L. Rivest. Certiﬁcate chain discovery in
SPKI/SDSI. Journal of Computer Security, 9(4):285–
322, 2001.
[7] S. A. Crosby and D. S. Wallach. Denial of service
via algorithmic complexity attacks. USENIX Security,
2003.
[8] D. Dean and A. Stubbleﬁeld. Using client puzzles to
protect tls. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium. USENIX, Aug. 2001.
11[9] J. DeTreville. Binder, a logic-based security language.
In Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Se-
curity and Privacy, pages 105–113. IEEE Computer
Society Press, May 2002.
[10] T. Dierks and C. Allen. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0,
Jan. 1999. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2246.txt.
[11] C. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. Rivest,
B. Thomas, and T. Ylonen. SPKI certiﬁcate theory.
IETF RFC 2693, Sept. 1999.
[12] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory. MIT Press,
1991.
[13] L. Gong and P. Syverson. Fail-stop protocols: An ap-
proach to designing secure protocols. In Proceedings
of the 5th International Working Conference on De-
pendable Computing for Critical Applications, Sep-
tember 1995.
[14] C. A. Gunter and T. Jim. Policy-directed certiﬁ-
cate retrieval. Software: Practice & Experience,
30(15):1609–1640, Sept. 2000.
[15] A. Herzberg, Y. Mass, J. Mihaeli, D. Naor, and
Y. Ravid. Access control meets public key infrastruc-
ture, or: Assigning roles to strangers. In Proceedings
of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 2–14. IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2000.
[16] A. Hess, J. Jacobson, H. Mills, R. Wamsley, K. E. Sea-
mons, and B. Smith. Advanced client/server authen-
tication in TLS. In Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium, pages 203–214, Feb. 2002.
[17] T. Jim. SD3: A trust management system with cer-
tiﬁed evaluation. In Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 106–115.
IEEE Computer Society Press, May 2001.
[18] A. Juels and J. Brainard. Client puzzles: A crypto-
graphic defense against connection depletion attacks.
In Proceedings of the 1999 Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium, February 1999.
[19] A. D. Keromytis. The KeyNote trust-management
system. http://www.cis.upenn.edu/∼angelos/
keynote.html.
[20] N. Li, B. N. Grosof, and J. Feigenbaum. Delegation
Logic: A logic-based approach to distributed autho-
rization. ACM Transaction on Information and System
Security, 6(1):128–171, Feb. 2003.
[21] N. Li, J. C. Mitchell, and W. H. Winsborough. De-
sign of a role-based trust management framework. In
Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 114–130. IEEE Computer Society
Press, May 2002.
[22] N. Li, W. H. Winsborough, and J. C. Mitchell. Dis-
tributed credential chain discovery in trust manage-
ment. Journal of Computer Security, 11(1):35–86,
Feb. 2003.
[23] C. Meadows. A Cost-Based Framework for Analysis
of Denial of Service Networks. Journal of Computer
Security, 9:143–164, 2001.
[24] R. L. Rivest and B. Lampson. SDSI — A sim-
ple distributed security infrastructure, Oct. 1996.
http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/∼rivest/sdsi11.html.
[25] T. Ryutov, L. Zhou, C. Neuman, T. Leithead, and K. E.
Seamons. Adaptive trust negotiation and access con-
trol. In Proceedings of the tenth ACM symposium
on Access control models and technologies (SACMT),
pages 139–146, 2005.
[26] X. Wang and M. Reiter. Defending against denial-of-
service attacks with puzzle auction. In IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy, May 2003.
[27] X. Wang and M. Reiter. Mitigating bandwidth-
exhaustion attacks using congestion puzzles. In Pro-
ceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer
and Communication Security, November 2004.
[28] W. H. Winsborough, K. E. Seamons, and V. E. Jones.
Automated trust negotiation. In DARPA Information
Survivability Conference and Exposition, volume I,
pages 88–102. IEEE Press, Jan. 2000.
[29] M. Winslett, T. Yu, K. E. Seamons, A. Hess, J. Jacob-
son, R. Jarvis, B. Smith, and L. Yu. Negotiating trust
on the web. IEEE Internet Computing, 6(6):30–37,
November/December 2002.
[30] T. Yu, M. Winslett, and K. E. Seamons. Supporting
structured credentials and sensitive policies through
interoperable strategies for automated trust negotia-
tion. ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security, 6(1):1–42, Feb. 2003.
12